POLITIQ

Since October 7th 2023, a new Middle East has emerged. War in Gaza and Lebanon, as well as the sudden implosion of the Assad regime in Syria, have profoundly reshaped the power dynamics in the region and Iran, once a regional hegemon, is at its weakest since the Islamic revolution. Two actors, on the other hand, find themselves in a particularly strong position – Israel and Turkey.

Whilst Israel has essentially crushed Hamas in Gaza and severely weakened Lebanese Hezbollah, until recently a major threat to the Jewish state, Turkey is reaping the benefits of the HTS takeover in Damascus and expanding its regional influence. But tensions between the two powers are rising over the new political reality in Syria, which some analysts predict may erupt into open conflict.

It is first important to examine Israeli and Turkish interests in Syria and how these diverge. Israel wishes to neutralise the supposed jihadist threat on its northern border. To this end, it has conducted airstrikes on militarily significant sites, most recently in Palmyra on March 21st, worried that these could fall into the hands of hostile forces. These include the new Syrian administration which Israel considers extremist, given Al Sharaa’s Al Qaeda roots. It has also launched incursions into southern Syrian towns such as Koya and Ma’ariya, occupied the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) zone, called for the demilitarisation of the provinces of Deraa, Suweida and Quneitra and advocated for a federal system giving autonomy to the Alawites, Druze and Kurds and limiting the power of the new administration and the Sunni majority.

Tied to this is a desire to limit the expansion of Turkish influence southwards, motivations for which are twofold. On the one hand, Israel is fearful that this would pose a security threat, given Turkey’s support for Hamas. On the other, Turkey is a major rival for regional hegemony and its presence in central and southern Syria threatens to restrict Israel’s freedom of operations.

For its part, Turkey wishes to secure its southern border, which involves eliminating the threat posed by the YPG dominated SDF and dismantling the Kurdish led autonomous administration as well as combating ISIS, use its leverage with the new government to expand its influence in the region from its previous stronghold in northern Syria and establish stability in the country to facilitate a return of the millions of refugees residing in it. In contrast to Israel, therefore, Turkey favours a strong centralised government in which Kurds and others integrate into the state and is the most active outside supporter of Al Sharaa’s administration, establishing joint military committees and providing training to the Syrian army. It is currently contemplating the construction of a new base and is in discussions regarding the acquisition of a military field unit in Palmyra, which would significantly further its ability to project power in southern Syria and confront Israeli forces.

So what is the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Israel and Turkey? Firstly, there is a real prospect of further Israeli expansion into Syria given Israel’s pledge to protect the Druze community and enforce a demilitarisation zone reaching the Damascus-Suweida highway, which lies some 65 km from the current positions of Israeli troops. This would drastically increase the odds of clashes with Syrian forces, which could drag in Turkey, particularly as Al Sharaa attempts to integrate Druze militias in Suweida, and Sunni fighters in Quneitra and Deraa, into the army.

But would Turkey risk engaging the IDF in defence of Syrian forces, given Israel’s reputation for fierce retaliation and the possibility of igniting another destabilising war in Syria that would prevent the return of refugees? And who is to say the Jewish state would actually intervene directly if Damascus moved to integrate the Druze by force? Although the community was persecuted during the Syrian civil war, Israel never conducted military action to protect it. It could instead opt to provide weaponry to Druze militias, as Turkey has already accused it of doing with the Alawites, to minimise the risk of conflict with its regional rival, a NATO member. Indeed, Israel is likely wary of a response from European NATO allies, though Trump’s apparent lack of commitment to the alliance may alleviate its concerns. What’s more, most Druze see their future with Syria and want to keep Israel at arm’s length, although they may use its support as leverage with Damascus. Would Israel be able to intervene directly if Druze leaders rejected such action?

Secondly, Turkish efforts to limit Israel’s operational freedom, something Israel considers of existential importance given its necessity in targeting Hezbollah supply routes and preventing hostile forces establishing a presence close to its border, may push it to consider direct confrontation. Certainly, Israel has reportedly been undertaking preparations for this and appears to be normalising rhetoric of an inevitable confrontation, suggesting this is something it is seriously considering. However, with the prospect of a US withdrawal from Syria, Turkey is poised to lead efforts to counter ISIS and has partnered with regional countries to this end. Given Israel’s own concerns about extremism, would it risk confronting Turkey given the latter’s indispensable role? Much will depend on whether US forces remain.

Moreover, Israel’s desire to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia may act as a further constraint. Before October 7th, the two countries were close to an agreement but with the eruption of war in Gaza, this was derailed as Arab populations across the region rallied to the Palestinian cause. Direct Israeli military action against Turkey would further enrage the Arab street, particularly as Turkey has projected an image of itself as a protector of Muslims, and could set back normalisation further. It is worth considering, however, that the opposite may be true. Given Saudi concerns of expanding Turkish influence, Israel may conclude that action taken to limit this might improve ties with the Kingdom and potentially advance the cause of normalisation.

Much remains up in the air and the danger of a Turkish-Israeli conflict in Syria should be taken seriously. But considering the multitude of factors constraining escalation, we can be hopeful of a more peaceful outcome for now.